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Abstract 
This paper provides an analysis of the labour market adjustment to the 2008-2009 recession in 
terms of employment, unemployment, hours worked and wages. It highlights differences in 
the response of employment and unemployment across countries and different socioeconomic 
groups. For all EU Member States, it provides evidence of the developments during the crisis 
of the monthly job finding and separation rates. This helps to assess whether the increase in 
unemployment is due to an increase of job separation or to a decline in the job finding rate. 
The paper discusses the risks of jobless growth and compares the dynamics of unemployment 
and employment across different periods. It provides evidence of an asymmetric response 
over the cycle, with recessions being characterised by more job destruction than by job 
creation in the following recoveries. The analysis of the wage dynamics during the recession 
suggests that there has been an adjustment in the compensation per employee led by the 
variable component; yet, this has not been sufficient to avoid the increase in the nominal unit 
labour costs due to labour hoarding. 
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SUMMARY FOR NON SPECIALISTS 
 
In 2008 and 2009 European economies were subjected to shocks of unprecedented severity. 
GDP declined in all countries and, in some cases, output losses were the largest recorded at 
least since the recession of the early 1970s. Because of this unprecedented collapse in world 
economic activity, many have dubbed this as the Great Recession1. Bearing in mind the size 
of the shock, the EU unemployment rate increased initially only to a limited extent. This 
paper provides an analysis of the labour market adjustment in terms of quantities 
(employment, unemployment, hours worked) and price of labour, whilst at the same time 
recognising that many uncertainties remain around the short-term outlook.  
 
We assess the labour market response from an international comparative perspective, 
acknowledging that whilst all countries have been hit by the global financial shock, the size of 
the labour market adjustment and its composition has been significantly different across 
countries. This heterogeneity across countries may be due to the size of domestic and external 
imbalances, as well as to the particular characteristics of the workforce in those industries 
mostly affected by the crisis. 
 
It is clear that the burden of the recession has not been evenly spread across different socio-
economic groups. For example, workers with weaker work contracts, the less qualified and 
less experienced workers have borne the brunt of the current recession. In many countries, job 
destruction has been more intense in male dominated sectors but the (preliminary) evidence 
provided suggests that the industry mix of male employment only partially explains these 
differences. It is the size of the initial imbalances, combined with the prevalence of men in 
specific sectors, which may have contributed to the differences in the labour market responses 
during the recession quarters.  
 
Comparisons with previous recessions also reveal that the relative effects of the current 
recession on men and women are not particularly unusual, despite men having lost jobs in 
disproportionate numbers - a conclusion also valid for the US. One unique element of the 
2008/2009 recession is, however, the increase in the young unemployment rates.  
 
In order to have a better understanding of the elements influencing the labour market 
response, one needs to examine the upward and downward movements in unemployment 
driven by inflows into (job destruction) and/or outflows from unemployment (job finding), 
which respond differently to shocks and to the constraints and incentives created by labour 
market institutions. Elsby et al (2009) developed a methodology to exploit annual and 
quarterly Labour Force Survey (LFS) data to measure annual averages of monthly 
unemployment flows for the OECD countries. We have adapted this methodology by 
exploiting quarterly and monthly LFS data in order to measure quarterly averages of monthly 
unemployment flows for all the EU27 countries. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first 
paper to provide a description of inflows and outflows rates during the recession quarters. We 
also provide an estimate of the flow steady state unemployment rate (i.e. the unemployment 
rate consistent with balanced inflows into and outflows out of unemployment). When the 
actual unemployment rate is below the steady state, as now in Europe, there are more inflows 
into than outflows from unemployment. This in turn implies that the unemployment rate will 
rise further in the near future, as far as the two flows will balance. A closer look at the 
                                                 
1 Strauss-Kahn (2009), "Crisis Management and Policy Coordination: Do We Need a New Global Framework?" Speech given at the 
Oesterreichische Nationalbank. http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2009/051509.htm  
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individual countries also highlights very heterogeneous patterns in inflows and outflows. For 
example, both flows increase in the Nordic countries, whilst some countries like Spain and 
Ireland are experiencing an impressive surge in the inflow rate. The same holds true for the 
Baltic countries, albeit on a smaller scale, whilst, finally, inflow and outflows do not change 
much for countries such as Germany and Italy. 
The adjustment in the average hours worked was a key factor in limiting the increase in 
unemployment at the early stage of the recession and the subsequent size of the labour 
hoarding raises concerns about the labour market response at the early stages of the recovery. 
We provide evidence of an asymmetric response of employment and unemployment over the 
cycle, with recessions being characterised by more job destruction than by job creation in the 
recoveries which followed. On the positive side, compared to the recession of the early 1990s, 
our analysis suggests that the expected increase in unemployment is similar to that estimated 
for the recession of the early 1990s but will probably be less persistent over time. This 
persistence can be influenced by a deterioration of the matching between vacant posts and 
unemployed people as the average unemployment rate increases.  Evidence based on survey 
data suggests that, so far, in this recession the increase in unemployment rates linked to 
mismatching is due to a lack of demand for labour rather than an increase in the mismatch 
between vacant posts and skills.  In other words, there have been changes along the Beveridge 
curve rather than changes of the position of the curve.  Yet, the size of adjustment required in 
certain sectors may imply that sectoral shifts may take time to occur, rendering the skills of 
workers, especially those formerly employed in industries with non-transferable skills, 
obsolete. However, estimates based on past evidence suggest that the impact of sectoral 
reallocation on structural unemployment seems on average small.  
 
The shape of the unemployment response is influenced by the capacity of wages to reflect 
changes in demand. We have observed that, whilst there has been an adjustment in the 
compensation per employee, led by the fall in the variable component, this has not been 
sufficient to avoid the increase in the nominal unit labour costs due to labour hoarding. This 
type of response may have contributed to stabilising incomes and consumption, but it may 
also create competitive pressures at the early stage of the recovery if negotiated wages do not 
incorporate the impact of the recession.  
 
There are extensions to this analysis, which we believe could be of further interest. First, we 
provided evidence of heterogeneous impact of the crisis on socioeconomic groups and 
countries. Further work should attempt to quantify, in a multivariate framework, the 
determinants of this differentiated performance. In doing so, one could take into account the 
role played by initial institutional and macroeconomic conditions, in particular, as far as the 
configuration of labour market institutions and various imbalances prevailing before the crisis 
are concerned, and of workers' socio-demographic characteristics. Second, further work could 
also try to assess the extent of the stabilisation of employment and unemployment of the 
measures enacted in response to the crisis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction  
When Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy in September 2008, many commentators started 
to draw parallels with the consequences of the US Stock market crash of October 1929. One 
year into the current recession, the worldwide economy was tracking, or even doing worse, 
than during the same stage period of the Great Depression (Eichengreen and O'Rourke, 2009). 
The fall in world trade and in the stock markets, more rapid in the first year of current 
recession than in the comparable period of the early 30s', the vulnerabilities and the 
tremendous disarray of the financial and housing sectors, combined with global trade 
imbalances and rising pessimistic expectations, made the world economy ripe for a second 
"slide in the abyss". That the risk was real was confirmed, as in the interwar period, by the 
swift international transmission of a crisis which originated in the US.  
 
The great depression is usually taken as the prototype of a global crisis. The collapse in the 
demand that followed the stock market crash in 1929 was transmitted to the rest of the world 
via deterioration in expectations. As the uncertainties about the sustainability of the Gold 
Standard unfolded, the fall in demand became entrenched in a low labour utilisation and 
output (e.g. Bernanke, 1996). Staying in the Gold Standard constrained central banks ability 
to lower interest rates to combat unemployment, which otherwise would have been forced to 
abandon the peg.  As countries started to abandon the Gold standard, they were able to rapidly 
increase money supply and promote a rapid recovery. Conversely, those that remained in the 
system suffered a monetary contraction that caused persistent output and employment losses 
(Eichengreen and Sachs, 1985; Bernanke, 1995). With falling imports many countries 
introduced protective measures that further reinforced the collapse in the world trade.  
 
The incomplete adjustment of nominal wages to the decline in the price level has been 
considered as one element that delayed the adjustment, contributing to the propagation of the 
deflationary shock (Newell and Symons, 1988; Bernanke and Carey, 1996; Bordo et al, 2000). 
The fall in the price level, unaccompanied by a comparable downward wage adjustment, put 
firms' profitability, especially the more intensive users of labour, under strain (Newell and 
Symons, 1988; Ohanian, 2009). The sharpest decline in manufacturing output was 
experienced by countries where nominal wages adjusted relatively slowly to changing prices 
(Newell and Symons, 1988 and Bernanke, 1995). The impact on unemployment was 
minimised by a fall in the average hours worked, which varied across countries depending on 
the real wage adjustment and the availability of unemployment insurance system, which some 
considered having shifted the balance of adjustment toward the extensive margin (Harrison 
and Hart, 1985). One distinctive element of the Great Depression is the increase in labour 
supply of many family members in response to the increase in unemployment of the principal 
bread winner (Margo 1988 for evidence on the US). Finally, both the incidence of long-term 
unemployment and of average unemployment spells rose dramatically in the interwar period 
while, in many countries, men, older and young workers took the brunt of the labour market 
adjustment.  
 
One unique element of the current great contraction concerns the size and timing of the policy 
response, which contrasts with the largely uncoordinated action of the early 1930s. Similarly, 
compared to the early 30s, no outbreak of protectionism was observed during the current 
recession (Baldwin, 2009). Moreover, while the inflationary pressures abated, persistent 
decreases in output prices were not observed. In assessing the labour market response during 
the recession, it should be considered that the European labour markets are nowadays 
fundamentally different from the sclerotic markets of only two decades earlier. Under the 
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pressure of high and persistent unemployment and low employment rates, an incremental and 
continuous process of labour market reforms started in the mid 1990s. Increased economic 
‘turbulence’ and demographic developments represented exogenous pressures to relieve the 
constraints to labour supply. As shown elsewhere, these reforms have been successful in 
raising employment rates and the labour market flexibility of especially of those groups with 
low labour market attachment (Arpaia and Mourre 2010) as well as unemployment turnover 
and job-to-job shifts (Boeri and Garibaldi, 2009).   
 
We describe the labour market response in an international comparative perspective. All 
countries have been hit by the global financial shock, though the size of the labour market 
adjustment and its composition has been significantly different across countries. Thus, we 
follow the same methodological approach used by many scholars to identify the forces behind 
the worldwide propagation of the Great Crash (e.g. Bernanke 2000). This heterogeneity across 
countries can be effectively exploited to identify to what extent a) the existing labour market 
institutions have constrained or eased the labour market reaction b) the country specific policy 
response has been effective in smoothing out the worldwide shock. We leave this analysis for 
future work. Against this background, this paper provides an anatomy of the labour market 
adjustment in terms of quantities (employment, unemployment, hours worked) and price of 
labour. 
 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 documents the incidence of unemployment 
across different socio-economic groups. Section 3 describes how the employment and 
unemployment behave during the current recession compared to recessions of the past. We 
provide an original estimation and fresh evidence for all EU Member States of the inflows and 
outflows rates from unemployment during the crisis in Section 4. This helps to assess whether 
the increase in unemployment is due to an increase of job destruction or to a decline in the job 
finding rate. By examining the flows we can identify the effects of measures to stabilise 
employment and/or enhance the employability of newly unemployed workers. Section 5 
analyses the response of employment and the role of labour hoarding over the cycle. Section 6 
discusses factors that may delay a labour market recovery in the aftermath of the crisis. The 
impact of the crisis on the labour supply is briefly reviewed in section 7. The dynamics of 
wages is assessed in section 8. Section 9 concludes.  
2. Who are the unemployed? 
After years of relatively good performance, driven by the dynamism of the female and older 
workers components, the EU labour market recorded a pronounced slowdown in 2009 with 
significant job losses occurring across many countries and sectors. Unemployment in the EU 
reached its lowest rate (6.8%) in a decade in second quarter of 2008. Since then and up to the 
second quarter of 2009, GDP has fallen by about 5%, while the jobless rate has increased by 
more than 2 pps. For the euro area, the lowest unemployment rate was achieved in the first 
quarter of 2008; since then the harmonised unemployment rate has risen steadily to reach 10% 
in November 2009. Almost three years of progress in bringing the unemployment rate down  
from 9% to 6.8% was wiped out in less than one year (Graph 1). 
 
Graph 2 reports the unemployment rate for the EU15, US and Japan and for selected EU 
countries. While the jobless rate remains mainly unchanged in Japan, it pick ups in early 2008 
quite at the same time in the EU and the US. In both sides of the Atlantic the increase in un-
employment was the largest since more than a decade. Yet, notwithstanding a smaller 
contraction of output vis-à-vis the EU, the increase in unemployment is much stronger in the 
US.  
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There is a significant heterogeneity within European countries. At the onset of the crisis, the 
bulk of job losses was concentrated in just a few Member States (the Baltic States, Spain and 
Ireland), largely as a result of pre-existing weaknesses as well as a larger exposure to the 
direct consequences of the shocks. However, the crisis subsequently put a widespread brake 
on domestic demand across the whole of the EU at a time when external demand was fading, 
and employment started falling in all Member States. The unemployment rate increased 
everywhere, particularly in the countries in which the crisis had already a very strong impact 
in 2008. During the recession, the increase in unemployment was rapid in France, Portugal, 
the UK, Denmark, Ireland, and, especially, Spain where it started to increase already one year 
earlier (in June 2007). Conversely, it was relatively mild and delayed in Germany and Italy. 
 
Graph 1 – Unemployment rates in the EU  
-5.0
0.0
5.0
10.0
15.0
20.0
25.0
ES IE LV LT EE PL SK EA HU EU FR DE SE BE US PT EL IT UK FI BG RO MT CZ SI AT LU DK JP NL CY
2008 2009 July 2010 forecast 2011 forecast  
Source: LFS, Commission's Autumn Forecasts. 
 
Workers with weaker work contracts (e.g. temporary contracts, on-call jobs), the less 
qualified and the less experienced workers have borne much of the brunt of the current 
recession (Table 1). Men, especially young, tend to be overrepresented in these categories. 
Conversely, women have been so far less affected than men. Yet, for the first time since the 
fourth quarter of 2005, female employment was in the first quarter of 2009 below the level of 
one year earlier (though by only 0.1%). 
 
In the US men have been more hardly hit than women by the recession. Yet, this is not 
unusual compared to previous recent recessions. The greater impact on men is only partially 
explained by differences in the distribution of men across industries. Other factors such as 
differences in the educational and demographic characteristics of men and women may have 
contributed. Among these characteristics, married people saw smaller job losses than did their 
single counterparts. Within married people, the effect of the recession on the employment of 
men was almost nine times that on women, whereas the effect for single men was 2.4 times 
that for single women. In part, the lower unemployment risks of married women can be 
explained by the added-worker effect (Engemann and Wall, 2009). 
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Graph 2 - Unemployment rate, seasonally adjusted, ILO definition 
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Between the second quarter of 2008 and the first quarter 2009, men bore 78% of the total job 
losses in the EU, the same percentage accounted by men in the US. The disproportionate 
effect of the recession on men could be related to the severity of the crisis first and foremost 
in sectors (e.g. construction and manufacturing), where male employment is relatively high, 
accounting for 90% and 70% of total employment respectively. Since the beginning of the 
recession these sectors lost about 9% of their jobs accounting together for 70% of total job 
destruction in the sectors (Table 2). However, the industry mix of male employment does not 
always explain the overall sectoral employment growth at the country level. Graph 3 shows 
the correlation across sectors between total employment growth and share of men in the 
sector. This correlation is negative for Spain, which is consistent with the view that the shock 
is mainly harming industries where the share of men in disproportionately high, positive for 
Italy, implying that employment growth is higher in industries where the share of men is high, 
and zero for France and Germany.  
 
Turning to the age groups, the unemployment rate of young people (15-24) jumped in one 
year by 4 pps. to 20%.  Their employment, down by 1 million or 5% quarter-on-quarter in the 
fourth quarter of 2008, declined by another million in the first quarter of 2009. Although the 
fall in employment of prime age workers, limited in the fourth quarter of 2008, intensified in 
the first quarter of 2009 (when about 3 million jobs were lost), young workers have been the 
most hardly hit age group. All this suggests that the differentiated labour market response to a 
common shock could be explained by the nature of the internal and external imbalances 
prevailing at the time of the shock.  
 
Table 1 - Employment growth by type of contracts and level of education 
Employment growth y-o-y 1.6% 1.6% 0.6% -1.1% -1.6%
Employees 1.8% 1.9% 1.2% -0.9% -1.4%
Self-employed 4.0% 0.4% -1.7% -1.8% -1.8%
Part-time* 4.6% 2.7% 1.4% 0.0% 0.7%
Full-time* 2.3% 2.2% 0.5% -1.4% -2.1%
Temporary employment 3.9% 1.3% -2.9% -8.5% -8.3%
low skilled -0.8% -1.1% -3.8% -5.5% -5.4%
medium skilled 2.5% 1.4% 1.4% -1.1% -1.6%
high skilled 4.4% 4.4% 4.0% 3.3% 2.6%
Employment growth y-o-y 1.2% 1.7% 0.7% -1.0% -1.6%
Employees 1.5% 2.0% 1.3% -0.8% -1.5%
Self-employed 1.9% 0.7% -1.5% -1.3% -1.4%
Part-time* 3.1% 2.4% 1.4% 0.3% 1.0%
Full-time* 2.0% 2.2% 0.7% -1.3% -2.2%
Temporary employment 4.4% 0.2% -2.8% -7.0% -6.3%
low skilled -1.2% -1.4% -3.4% -4.7% -4.9%
medium skilled 1.9% 1.6% 1.1% -1.5% -2.6%
high skilled 4.4% 4.5% 4.0% 3.3% 3.1%
2008 second 
half 2009 Q22009Q1Avg 2000-2007 2008 first half
Euro-Area
European Union
Avg 2000-2007 2008 first half 2008 second half 2009 Q22009Q1
 
Source: Labour Force Survey, Eurostat. 
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Table 2 - Sectoral employment growth 2008q1-2008q4 
Agriculture
Mining and 
quarrying Industry Manufacturing Construction
Wholesale 
and retail 
trade
Market 
Services 
Hotels and 
restaurants
Transport 
and comm.
Financial 
intermediation
Real estate and 
business 
activities
Public 
administration Education
Other 
services
Health and 
social work Total
Males -1.6 -0.1 -1.1 -1.3 -1.8 -1.5 -0.9 -3.5 -0.7 0.6 0.3 0.0 -0.8 0.6 2.3 -0.5
Total -2.5 -1.2 -1.0 -1.1 -1.9 -0.7 -0.7 -3.9 -0.3 2.4 -0.4 0.8 0.4 1.3 2.8 -0.1
Share of 
men 63.7 86.4 76.9 69.9 91.5 51.1 55.0 45.2 74.1 48.3 55.3 54.2 29.7 28.7 22.2 55.0
Sectoral 
share (Total) 4.7 0.4 33.0 19.5 11.9 11.8 33.7 3.1 7.3 2.4 9.1 6.4 3.3 10.7 3.6 100  
Source: Labour Force Survey, Eurostat. 
 
Table 3 - Employment and participation rates by age and gender 
Employment rate (ages 15-64), %
total 63.2 66.1 66.2 64.7 64.9
young (15-24) 37.0 38.0 38.2 35.3 35.1
prime-age (25-54) 76.9 79.5 79.5 78.1 78.2
older (55-64) 38.3 44.4 44.8 44.5 45.5
male 72.0 73.4 73.4 71.2 71.3
female 54.4 58.8 59.1 58.1 58.5
Participation rate (ages 15-64)
total 69.1 71.4 71.7 71.4 71.6
young (15-24) 44.3 44.5 45.4 43.7 43.7
prime-age (25-54) 83.3 85.2 85.3 85.3 85.3
older (55-64) 41.4 46.8 47.5 47.8 48.8
male 77.8 78.7 78.9 78.4 78.6
female 60.4 63.9 64.4 64.3 64.7
Employment rate (ages 15-64), %
total 63.2 65.8 66.1 64.6 64.8
young (15-24) 36.6 37.6 37.9 35.3 35.0
prime-age (25-54) 77.0 79.6 79.7 78.2 78.4
older (55-64) 40.4 45.6 46.0 45.5 46.4
male 70.9 72.8 72.9 70.8 70.9
female 55.6 59.1 59.4 58.4 58.8
Participation rate (ages 15-64)
total 69.3 70.7 71.2 70.8 71.1
young (15-24) 44.5 43.9 45.1 43.5 43.6
prime-age (25-54) 83.4 84.7 84.9 84.8 84.9
older (55-64) 43.2 47.8 48.4 48.6 49.4
male 77.2 77.8 78.2 77.6 77.8
female 61.5 63.7 64.2 64.0 64.4
Avg 2000-2007 2008 first half 2008 second half 2009 Q22009Q1
Euro-Area
European Union
Avg 2000-2007 2008 first half 2008 second half 2009 Q22009Q1
 
Source: Labour Force Survey, Eurostat. 
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Graph 3 - Employment growth and the male share of industry employment  
(averages over countries) 
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3. Evidence from previous recessions 
Looking at previous recessions can help detect to what extent the current labour market 
adjustment is congruent with past episodes. Table 4 reports the average intensity and duration 
of the past and the last recession for the largest EU countries (Germany, Italy, France and the 
UK) and the US, while Graph 4 shows the changes in the total, male and female 
unemployment rates during the recession and the 12 month following the end of the recession. 
 
During the recessions of the past 40 years, output contracted on average for about 3 quarters 
by 0.5% each quarter. In response to this contraction, unemployment increased consecutively 
for about 6 quarters by 0.03 pp. each quarter. Men and young workers were much harder hit 
than women. Thus, despite men have lost jobs in disproportionate numbers during the current 
recession, the relative effects of the recession on men and women are not particularly unusual 
- a conclusion also valid for the US (Wall 2009). Unemployment spiked quickly and did not 
fall back to its pre-recession level for several years. For example, in the aftermath of the 
recession of the early 1990s, GDP contracted for about five quarters in Italy and the UK and 
two quarters in Germany and France. However, the unemployment rate returned to its pre-
recession levels only after more than 30 months following the start of the recession in Italy 
and the UK and after about 20 months in France and Germany. During the recovery of the 
early 2000s, the behaviour of the labour market differed from that of the average cycle. (2) 
For example, the increase in output in Spain and Italy between 2003 and 2004 translated 
almost entirely into higher employment. In France, where one year after the trough the 
recovery was jobless, the increase in productivity was higher and the participation rate less 
responsive than in the average recovery. In the UK, employment continued to increase up to 
two quarters ahead of the trough of GDP and stagnated thereafter. In Germany, the recovery 
was less atypical as the weak recovery was accompanied by only modest employment growth.  
                                                
 
Compared to the past recessions, the output loss during the last recession (about 1.2% each 
quarter) was particularly large, yet less short-lived than the average recession - 5 consecutive 
quarters of negative growth against an average of 3 quarters. Thus, notwithstanding the initial 
labour hoarding, the size of this loss implied an increase in unemployment and decline in 
employment larger than that observed in past recessions. Even so, in Europe the apparent 
elasticity of employment (unemployment) is lower than in previous episodes; conversely, the 
US experience a much stronger labour market adjustment during the current recession. 
Compared to a small decline of the past recessions, the participation rate increased slightly in 
the 2008-2009 recession. The burden of the recession is spread unevenly across demographic 
groups. Graph 5 compares for the largest EU countries the evolution of unemployment rate 
during the recession and the following year. The unemployment of the young is always more 
reactive to the business cycle than the total unemployment rate. Yet, the increase in the young 
unemployment rate is almost twice as much as the increase experienced during the previous 
deep recession of the early 1990s. Moreover, compared to past recessions, men have 
accounted in the recession that started in 2008 for the largest increase in unemployment rate, 
 
2 DG ECFIN (2004), "Labour Market and Wage Developments. Special focus on the risks of jobless growth ", 
European Economy, No 3. 
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in particular in Italy and Germany. Finally, there is a striking contrast between the behaviour 
of unemployment in the US in the aftermath of the severe recessions of the early 1980s and 
1981 and that that followed the two most recent recessions in 1990-1991 and 2001, which has 
made many observers to qualify the last two recoveries as jobless.  
 
 
 
 
Table 4 - Average intensity and duration of past recessions in  the largest EU countries and the US  
 Decline of GDP /increase of unemployment Duration of contraction/increase in quarters Quarters needed to recover to 
pre-crisis levels 
 Largest EU countries United States Largest EU countries United States Largest EU 
countries 
United States 
 average 
recession 
last 
recession 
average 
recession 
last 
recession 
average 
recession 
last 
recession 
average 
recession 
last 
recession 
average 
recession 
average 
recession 
GDP -0.5% -1.2% -0.9% -1.0% 3 5 2 4 3.6 3.25 
Unemployment 0.18 pp. 0.30 pp. 0.70 pp. 0.90 pp. 5 5 2 4 : : 
Activity rate -0..02 pp. 0.02 pp. -0.035 
pp. 
 6 5 
2 
4   
Employment -0.18% -0.31% -0.21% -1.0% 6 5 3 4 : : 
Apparent elasticity 
Unemployment 
Employment 
 
-0.34 
0.34 
 
-0.24 
0.25 
 
-0.72 
0.24 
 
-0.93 
1.05 
 
: 
 
: 
 
: 
 
: 
 
: 
 
: 
Source: Authors' calculations. Largest countries include, Germany France, Italy and the UK. The reference periods for the calculations are the following: for GDP we consider the decline during the recession period; for 
unemployment and activity rates, the increases are calculated from the beginning of the recession until the last positive change in unemployment; for employment growth we measure the loss occurred since the 
recession until employment starts to grow again.  
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Graph 4 - Unemployment behaviour during recessions and first year of recoveries 
Changes in unemployment rate  around recessions
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Changes in the male unemployment rate around recessions
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Changes in female unemployment rate around recessions
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Graph 5 - Unemployment behaviour during recessions and first year of recoveries 
Changes in unemployment rate of young around recessions
-2
0
2
4
6
8
08
Q
2+
15
M
04
Q
4+
6M
03
Q
1+
6M
01
Q
2+
6M
92
Q
2+
18
M
82
Q
2+
9M
74
Q
4+
9M
08
Q
2+
12
M
92
Q
4+
6M
74
Q
4+
9M
08
Q
2+
12
M
02
Q
4+
9M
95
Q
4+
6M
91
Q
2+
6M
74
Q
4+
9M
08
Q
2
90
Q
3+
15
M
80
Q
1+
15
M
73
Q
3+
9M
75
Q
2+
6M
08
Q
1+
18
M
01
Q
2+
8M
90
Q
3+
8M
81
Q
3+
16
M
80
Q
1+
6M
73
Q
4+
16
M
Change in unemployment rate during the recession, percentage points Change in unemployment rate during the year following the end of the recession, percentage points
pps.
IT FR DE
UK
US
Change in unemployment rate during the current recession, percentage points
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Graph 6 - Employment behaviour during recessions and first year of recoveries 
Changes in total  employment around recessions
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4. Evidence from inflows and outflows 
Upward and downward movements in the unemployment rate are usually taken as a signal of 
a cyclical expansion or contraction. Yet, they provide only a sign of the state of the economy 
at one point in time, usually the week before the survey. In practice, fluctuations of 
unemployment are driven by a continuous process of job creation and job destruction. 
 
According to the standard theory of business cycles, these fluctuations are the outcomes of 
aggregate shocks which influence all firms similarly and are generated by policy shocks (e.g. 
changes in the stance of monetary and/or fiscal policies). This implies that job creation and 
job destruction rates mirror each other and their correlation coefficient is -1. Moreover, the 
predicted correlation between job reallocation rates and employment growth is very small. In 
this theoretical context, job flows are not of much interest. But, contrary to these predictions, 
the evidence provided by Davis et al (1996) for the US showed that job destruction and job 
reallocation rise sharply during recession, suggesting that there is an asymmetry in the 
cyclical response of job creation and job destruction.  
 
This asymmetry has spurred a rich literature, which cannot be summarised here. Yet, a 
premise of many studies is that differences in the behaviour of job creation and destruction 
rates are mainly due to idiosyncratic shocks (reallocation shocks /sector specific shocks) that 
impinge differently upon heterogonous workers. When search and matching frictions prevail, 
these shocks may become the major drivers of aggregate business fluctuations. Thus, a 
standard analysis of the business cycle would downplay the role of reallocation shocks and 
miss the mechanisms through which labour market institutions influence the size and the 
shape of their impact on job creation and job destruction.  
 
Notwithstanding their utility for policy purposes, labour market flows are not easy to measure. 
The European Labour Force Survey asks respondents their labour market status one year 
before the survey, providing an annual estimate of movements from and into unemployment. 
This measure presents some drawbacks. Firstly, it is subject to misreporting errors due to the 
long horizon respondents are asked about. Secondly, it is not useful for cyclical analysis as 
this information is available only annually. Thirdly, it underestimates the gross job destruction 
when the job finding rate is high, which introduces a bias in the measured cyclicality of the 
job separation rate3.   
 
In recent years, many have developed indirect measures of the inflows and outflows based on 
the information available from the LFS. We adapt the method developed by Shimer (2007) 
who used monthly data on unemployment duration to compute inflows and outflows from the 
relation describing the dynamics of unemployment rate. This method relies upon a series of 
assumptions, two of which are particularly important. First, workers neither enter nor exit 
from the labour force but simply transit between employment and unemployment. Second, all 
workers are ex ante identical and, in particular, in each period all unemployed workers have 
the same job finding probability and all employed the same exit probability. As for the first 
assumption, the evidence for the US shows that discarding flows into and out of the labour 
market does not affect the cyclical pattern of unemployment inflows and outflows, although it 
                                                 
3 This is what Shimer (2007) calls the time aggregation bias.  
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changes their level4. As for the second assumption, unemployment inflows and outflows rates 
can be referred to the average representative worker if workers are heterogeneous. 
The approach by Shimer cannot be applied to European countries as unemployment duration 
is not available at monthly frequencies in the European LFS. To overcome this limitation, 
Elsby, Hobijn and Sahin (2009) proposed a methodology that exploits annual and quarterly 
data to measure annual averages of monthly unemployment flows for the OECD countries. 
We apply the same methodology to estimate for all European countries quarterly averages of 
monthly job finding and job separation rates.  
 
Under these assumptions, and given the assumption of fixed labour force, the evolution of 
aggregate unemployment5, , can be written as: tu
( ) ttttt ufusu −−= 1&   [1] 
where is the monthly rate of inflows into unemployment;  is the monthly rate of 
unemployment outflows; t indexes months
ts tf
6. Thus, unemployment decreases when 
unemployed workers find a job, at the instantaneous rate  and increases when workers exit 
employment at the instantaneous rate . As in Elsby et al, we compute  and by relating 
this continuous time evolution of unemployment rate to the unemployment rate observed at 
discrete quarterly frequencies. To do this, we assume that the monthly flow hazards rates  
and  are constant within quarters.
tf
ts tf ts
tf
ts
7 In this case, solving eq. [1] forward one quarter allows 
us to write: 
( ) tttt tuuu λλ *3 1 +−= − ,  [2] 
where denotes the quarterly rate of convergence to the steady state and  )(31 tt fst e
+−
−=λ
tt
t
t fs
su
+
=
*    [3] 
is the flow steady-state unemployment rate, i.e. the level of unemployment consistent with 
balanced inflows and outflows; is the unemployment rate three months earlier, i.e. a 
quarter before (recall that t denotes months). According to equation [2], the actual 
unemployment is a weighted average of the previous unemployment rate and of the flow 
steady state. The weight of the latter (λ) is the convergence rate while that of the former (1-λ) 
measures the persistence of unemployment rate; both are function of the inflow rate into and 
outflow rates out of unemployment.  
3−tu
 
When the sum of these rates (i.e. the job reallocation rate) is high, the persistence of 
unemployment is low and unemployment converges to the steady-state quickly, eventually 
                                                 
4 In practice, the flows calculated by Shimer (2007) are total inflows into and outflows out of unemployment. 
Total inflows into unemployment are the sum of job separations (or job destruction) and movements from out-
of-the-labour force to unemployment. Total outflows from unemployment are the sum of job findings and 
movements from unemployment to inactivity. As emphasized by many authors, movements from and into 
inactivity over the business cycles are dominated by movements between employment and unemployment. 
5 Notice that ut can be interpreted as total unemployed once one normalizes the labour force to 1. Alternatively, 
under our assumption of fixed labour force,  ut  can be interpreted as the unemployment rate at time t and, 
consequently, the employment rate is 1- ut. 
6 As in Elsby et al. (2009), we prefer to call s the inflow rate (instead of job separation rate) and f  the outflow 
rate (instead of job finding rate) for the reason exposed in footnote 3. 
7 The hazard rate is the rate at which jobs are created or destroyed at time t conditional on survival in one of the 
two states until time t or later.  
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within the quarter. In such a case, equation [2] reduces to . In this case, the dynamics 
of unemployment is irrelevant as unemployment does not deviate from its steady state. On the 
contrary, for small flow rates, the dynamic behaviour of unemployment depends on evolution 
of both the flow steady-state and the convergence parameter λ. Thus, an increase in the inflow 
rate (or in the outflow rate) exerts two effects on current unemployment rate: 1) it increases 
(decreases) the steady state unemployment rate , towards which the current unemployment 
rate converges; 2) it changes the weight of the new steady state (λ) or, equivalently, the 
persistency of the observed unemployment rate, 1-λ. Clearly, when the turnover ( ) 
rises the convergence rate increases and the persistency of unemployment decreases (see 
definition of λ).  
*
t
uut ≅
*
tu
tt fs +
 
To measure , we follow Shimer (2007). The monthly change in the unemployment rate 
equals the number of unemployed workers at the end of the period who were employed at 
some point during the period (i.e. the short-term unemployment rate <tu minus the number of 
unemployed workers at time t-1 who found a job (with probability tF )  
tf
1 ) 
 
1
1
1 −
<
−
−=− ttttt uFuuu   [4a] or  
( ) 11 1 −< −+= tttt uFuu   [4b] 
Here  denotes the short-term unemployment rate, the unemployment rate for a duration 
less than one month and hence reflects the inflows into unemployment;  represents the 
outflows from unemployment. Solving for the monthly outflow probability, one obtains 
1<
tu
1−ttuF
1
1
1
−
<
−
−=
t
tt
t u
uuF   [5] 
Thus the probability that an unemployed worker finds a job during a period (the 'outflow 
probability') is a function of the number of unemployed workers at the start of the period, 
1−tu , the number of unemployed workers at the end of the period, tu , and the number of 
unemployed workers at the end of the period who were employed at some point during the 
period (i.e. short-term unemployment). The monthly outflow hazard rate 1<  is related to the 
monthly outflow probability  vie the following relation,  
 
tf
tF
)1ln(1 tt Ff −−=
<   [6] 
As Elsby et al. (2009) emphasized, when the persistence in unemployment rate is low (i.e. the 
unemployment rate is not far from its flow steady state on average), equation [5] gives a 
reliable estimates of the outflow probability (i.e. the job finding probability) and of the 
corresponding monthly hazard rate, . Once this rate is known, the inflow rate (i.e. the job 
separation rate)  and the associated monthly inflow probability, i.e. the probability of 
becoming unemployed, can be found out from equation [2]. 
1<
tf
ts
 
For European countries our prior is that the actual unemployment does not necessarily follow 
strictly the flow steady state unemployment rate, because of hysteresis in the unemployment 
rate (i.e. the job finding rate is low). In this case, estimates of  based only on the short-term 
unemployment rate can be noisy as the stock of newly unemployed each quarter is small, 
which increases the sampling variance of the LFS estimate of and leads to unreliable 
estimates of . Following Elsby et al (2009), we use the information available from the LFS 
tF
1<
tu
1<
tf
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on the unemployment rates by duration of spells to increase the precision of the estimate of 
the outflow rate (see box 1 for details). Given the estimated value of the outflow rate, we 
compute the inflow rate by solving the non-linear equation [2] for  as proposed originally 
by Shimer (2007).
ts ts
8  
 
Box 1: Estimation of the monthly outflow hazard rate  
As done for [5], one can write the probability that an unemployed worker exits unemployment within d 
months as 
dt
d
ttd
t u
uuF
−
<
< −
−= 1   [7] 
 
Thus, the probability that an unemployed person exits unemployment within the next d months equals 
one minus the probability of remaining unemployed after d months (
d
d
tu
−
<
t
t
u
u −
). As done for [6], this 
can be mapped into an outflow hazard rate: 
d
Ff
d
td
t
)1ln( << −
−=   [8] 
 
d
tf
< is the hazard rate associated with the probability that an unemployed worker at time t completes 
her spell within the subsequent d months. From LFS data, we can estimate for d=1, 3, 6, 12 dtf
<
months. The hazard rate may change with the spell of unemployment. For example, if there is negative 
duration dependence the outflow hazard rate declines with duration (i.e. ), as 126 << >> tt fff
3< >tf
1<
t
the probability of remaining unemployed after 3 months of unemployment is higher than the 
probability of remaining unemployed after 1 month of unemployment. Indeed  implies   31 << > tFtF
3<> tf
1<
tf . The same reasoning applies to the estimates on longer horizons. 
 
If the outflow rates do not depend on the unemployment duration (i.e. = = = ), each 1<tf
3<
tf
6<
tf
12<
tf
of the four rates is a consistent estimates of the job finding rate (i.e. the outflow rate from 
unemployment). Averaging over f is an unbiased estimate of the outflows rate, as it reduces stochastic 
volatility. On the contrary, if the hypothesis of duration dependence is supported by the data, , 3<tf
6<
tf  and will not give consistent estimates of the average outflow rate among the unemployed. In 
12<
tf
this case, an estimate of the short-term flows relies on  alone.  1<tf
 
Elsby et al. (2009) propose a test for duration dependence, i.e. for the 
hypothesis 91231 <<< == tttt ffff
6<
= . If this hypothesis is rejected (i.e. there is duration dependence), 
the monthly outflow rate can be estimated using  . On the contrary, if it is accepted, all information 1<tf
contained in ,  and  is exploited to get an unbiased estimate of the monthly outflow rate. 3<tf
6<
tf
12<
tf
             
                                                 
8  The non-linear equation is solved with the Golden Section method, Kiefer, J. (1953). 
9  For details, see Elsby et al. (2009) 
 20
Box 1 continued  
A second version of the test has a less stringent null hypothesis . We apply this 1263 <<< == ttt fff
method to EU27 countries based on Eurostat LFS data. We prefer the second version of the test, as for 
our prior is that the incidence of short-term unemployment in European countries is relatively low. In 
any case, using the first version would have led to the same conclusion for all countries but Belgium 
and Estonia. 
 
Table 5 reports the finding of the test of duration dependence. Evidence of duration 
dependence is found in Germany, Spain, Finland, France, Sweden, the UK, in EU27 and 
EUR16. This implies that the outflow probability (i.e. the job finding probability) varies with 
the duration of unemployment spells. Table 5 reports also the monthly average flow rates and 
the average actual and flow steady state unemployment rates [eq.2] for the period before the 
recession and for 2009q2, the last available quarter. Focussing on the implication for a) the 
unemployment rate; b) the persistence of unemployment and the steady state; c) the dynamics 
of unemployment rate, the following facts stand out of this table: 
 
• Unemployment rate. Before the crisis the unemployment rate had reached in many 
countries its lowest level since more than two decades; yet in several it was in 2009q2 
well above pre-crisis levels. 
 
• Steady state and persistence. As a consequence of a falling outflow rate (i.e. job 
finding) and increasing inflow rate (i.e. job separation rate), the flow steady-state 
unemployment increased almost everywhere. In some countries (the Czech Republic, 
Slovakia, Denmark the Netherlands, Slovenia, Romania, Finland), it is the rapid pick 
up in the inflow rate that drives the increase in the steady state, as the outflow rate 
even improves. In the remaining countries but France and Germany, the flow steady 
state unemployment rate increases as the inflow rate into unemployment increases and 
the outflow rate decreases. In France and Germany, both rates decline slightly which 
leads to respectively a small and no increase in steady state. In the Baltics, Spain, 
Ireland, and UK, the persistence of unemployment (1-λ, not shown for brevity) 
increases. In such cases, the increase in steady-state unemployment is driven not only 
by the higher inflow rate but also by the higher unemployment duration caused by the 
lower outflow rate. For other countries the persistence remained mainly unchanged.  
 
• Deviation of actual unemployment from flow steady state. How much higher or lower 
the actual unemployment rate is relative to the steady state is informative of the 
expected changes in the next quarters in the unemployment rate [see eq. 2]. When the 
steady-state unemployment is higher than the actual unemployment, the 
unemployment is increasing. The unemployment rate before the crisis was above the 
steady; after the crisis, it turned out to be lower than the (new) steady state. In terms of 
unemployment dynamics, this implies that in many countries the increase in 
unemployment is not over. 
 
In cross countries comparisons, there is a positive correlation between inflow and outflow 
rates (Graph 7). UK, Sweden, Spain, Finland and France do have a turnover larger than 
the average (over the all countries - the horizontal and the vertical lines represent the 
average flow rates). On the opposite side, there is a large majority of countries (for 
example, Italy, Portugal, Romania, the Netherlands, Slovenia, the Czech Republic) with 
smaller flows. During the crisis this positive relation becomes weaker, in particular owing 
to the above mentioned in the Baltic countries, Ireland and Spain.  
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According to graph 7, movements from pre-crisis to the crisis quarter of inflow and 
outflow rates could be interpreted as an indication of the dynamism of the labour market. 
Countries that moved along the regression line may have a better adjustment dynamics, 
because during the recession higher inflows into unemployment are accompanied by 
higher outflows from unemployment. It is worthwhile noting that among countries with 
this pattern, one can find the "flexicurity" models of Denmark, Finland and the 
Netherlands. Despite an increase in the jobless rate, the employment chances do not 
worsen in the recession in these countries. One potential explanation of this finding is that 
during recessions the cost of opening a vacancy raises (e.g. Hall, 2005). However, this 
cost is somewhat reduced by effective activation policies and by job search and assistance 
activities by public employment services that put pressure on unemployed and enhance 
the probability of a successful match. On the other hand, countries like the Baltics, Spain, 
and Ireland moved off the line and coupled an increased inflow rate with a decreased 
outflow rate, thus experiencing a massive rise in unemployment.  
  
So far we have focused on the flow hazard rates for worker transitions in and out of 
unemployment. These rates in turn generate actual worker flows into and out of 
unemployment. Graph 8 reports annual worker flows (as % of the labour force) and the 
annual change in the unemployment rate. A broadly accepted view about the behaviour of 
total flows in the business cycle is that gross flows increase when unemployment 
increases and changes in inflows tend to lead changes in outflows, as well as changes in 
the unemployment rate. Putting differently, the increase in inflows causes a rise in the 
stock of unemployed which leads to a rise in total outflows too, because the negative 
effect on outflows related to the lower outflow rate is dominated by the positive effect of 
the larger unemployment pool. This is exactly what has happened during the crisis in 
Denmark, Finland and the Netherlands and, to a lesser extent, in some other smaller 
countries.  
 
On the other side, it is clear that annual changes in unemployment in the Baltic countries, 
Spain and Ireland have been driven mainly by huge inflows into unemployment. In 
particular, in the case of Spain, the spectacular increase in the unemployment was led by a 
rise in inflows accompanied by a decrease in total outflows from unemployment. Thus, 
the decrease in the outflow rate (see Table 5) was so high that it worsened the 
employment perspective of an increase pool of unemployed, which raise concerns about 
long-term unemployment and risks of labour market detachment in this country. To a less 
extent, a similar patter can be identified in France and the UK. Moreover, during the 
recession quarters, the inflows into unemployment were relatively small in Italy and 
Germany while their outflows declined. It is tempting to relate this development to the 
intense recourse to short-time employment scheme in these countries. We leave for future 
work to investigate how the interaction between shocks and institutions account for the 
observed patterns in the dynamics of total flows.  
 
 
Graph 7 - Average inflows and outflows rate across countries 
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Table 5 - Test for no duration dependence and summary statistics on unemployment and flow rates 
Averages 2005q1-2008q1 2009q2
Country
Start of 
sample P -value 
H0 
rejected?
unemploy
ment rate 
(u)
outflow 
rate (f)
inflow 
rate (s)
steady 
state 
unemp.
unemploy
ment rate 
outflow 
rate (f) 
inflow 
rate (s) 
steady 
state 
unemp.
AT 2002 4% FALSE 4.8% 11.6% 0.5% 4.5% 4.7% 11.4% 0.7% 5.8%
BE 1999 3% FALSE 8.0% 6.0% 0.5% 7.3% 7.5% 5.5% 0.5% 8.4%
BG 2000 12% FALSE 8.6% 6.2% 0.4% 6.4% 6.4% 5.8% 0.5% 7.9%
CY 2005 18% FALSE 4.7% 14.2% 0.6% 4.4% 5.3% 17.6% 1.2% 6.4%
CZ 1998 46% FALSE 6.7% 6.6% 0.4% 5.3% 6.4% 7.6% 0.8% 9.5%
DE 2005 0% TRUE 10.0% 8.0% 0.8% 8.7% 7.8% 7.4% 0.7% 8.7%
DK 1999 2% FALSE 4.2% 14.4% 0.6% 3.8% 6.1% 18.1% 1.4% 7.2%
EE 2000 16% FALSE 5.7% 7.6% 0.4% 4.5% 13.6% 2.8% 1.3% 31.3%
ES 1998 0% TRUE 8.8% 20.5% 1.9% 8.6% 18.0% 8.8% 2.4% 21.5%
EU-27 2005 0% TRUE 8.1% 11.4% 0.9% 7.4% 8.9% 9.6% 1.1% 10.2%
EUR16 2005 0% TRUE 8.3% 11.4% 1.0% 7.8% 9.3% 8.9% 1.1% 11.0%
FI 1998 0% TRUE 7.7% 19.7% 1.6% 7.3% 9.7% 21.2% 2.1% 9.0%
FR 2003 0% TRUE 8.5% 15.3% 1.4% 8.6% 8.8% 12.7% 1.4% 9.9%
GR 1998 15% FALSE 9.1% 6.2% 0.5% 8.0% 9.0% 5.8% 0.7% 10.7%
HU 1999 29% FALSE 7.4% 6.1% 0.5% 7.7% 9.6% 5.8% 0.8% 12.1%
IE 2000 4% FALSE 4.5% 9.4% 0.4% 4.5% 12.1% 5.2% 1.3% 20.1%
IT 1998 2% FALSE 7.0% 6.6% 0.4% 6.4% 7.5% 6.3% 0.5% 7.4%
LT 2002 19% FALSE 6.1% 10.0% 0.5% 4.3% 13.7% 4.6% 1.7% 26.8%
LU 2003 57% FALSE 4.4% 11.0% 0.5% 4.4% 5.2% 12.8% 1.0% 7.2%
LV 2002 19% FALSE 7.3% 10.3% 0.7% 6.1% 17.2% 4.0% 2.0% 33.6%
MT 2002 27% FALSE 6.5% 7.4% 0.5% 6.6% 7.0% 7.8% 0.7% 8.2%
NL 2003 2% FALSE 3.9% 8.7% 0.3% 3.3% 3.3% 11.0% 0.5% 4.3%
PL 2000 25% FALSE 13.5% 7.4% 0.8% 9.6% 8.0% 9.6% 0.9% 8.6%
PT 1998 17% FALSE 8.2% 5.6% 0.5% 8.3% 9.6% 5.5% 0.7% 11.2%
RO 1999 5% FALSE 7.2% 5.0% 0.3% 5.8% 6.6% 5.9% 0.5% 7.8%
SE 2001 0% TRUE 6.9% -- -- -- 9.3% 24.5% 2.3% 8.6%
SI 1999 35% FALSE 5.8% 7.1% 0.4% 5.3% 5.7% 8.1% 0.8% 8.9%
SK 1998 41% FALSE 13.4% 3.8% 0.4% 9.0% 11.3% 4.7% 0.9% 16.1%
UK 2000 0% TRUE 5.2% 20.3% 1.1% 5.2% 7.7% 13.1% 1.3% 9.1%
average 7.3% 10.4% 0.7% 6.3% 8.8% 9.4% 1.1% 10.5%
Test for no duration
 
Source: Authors' calculations based on Labour Force Survey. The rejection of the null is based on a significance level of 1%; the reported P-values are sample averages for the test for no duration dependence over the 
sample period, based on the application of the sample size reported by Eurostat for the national LFS.
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Graph 8 – Workers flows (left scale) and unemployment rate (right scale)  
(as % of the labour force) 
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5. The role of labour hoarding in moderating the rise in unemployment 
During slowdowns firms hoard labour while cutting production, which implies a falling 
productivity growth. As the economy turns up, the increasing demand for output is met by 
firms with an increase in the hours worked before they start hiring again. Firms may usually 
decide not to adjust employment in line with transitory fluctuations in the demand of their 
products for different reasons. Firstly, adjusting the labour force can be costly because of 
hiring and firing costs associated to search and training costs and to the regulation of labour 
contracts. Secondly, firms may prefer to adjust the labour input at the intensive (i.e. hours 
worked) rather than at the extensive margin (i.e. workforce) to be able to increase its 
utilisation with no major recruiting, especially of scarce and expensive skilled-labour, when 
the recovery comes. A major feature during the early quarters of the last recession was the fall 
in output growth, accompanied only by a limited fall in employment growth for the EU as a 
whole (Graph 9). However, by the summer of 2009, the overall adjustment in unemployment 
rates had caught up with the average during past recessions.  
   
Graph 9 – GDP and labour input  
Employment and GDP growth in the EU: 1995q1-2009q2 
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The presence of labour hoarding during the current recession can be illustrated by the fall in 
the average hours worked in countries where the increase in unemployment is relatively small 
while the fall in GDP is big (Graph 9)10. For example, among countries with an output loss 
higher than the EU-27 average, the increase in unemployment is lower than average in 
Germany and Italy, while hours worked declined proportionally more than employment 
growth. 11 Conversely, the average number of hours worked increased slightly in France and 
declined in Spain, despite similar output losses in both countries - about 3% from the first 
quarter of 2008 to the first quarter of 2009. The increase in the average hours worked in 
France may be due to the effect of the TEPA law, implemented in 2007, which introduced a 
tax break on overtime work and increased overtime premiums in firms with less than 20 
employees. This reform might have led to an increase in the number of hours worked declared 
previously not reported in the statistics. Yet, most of the increase in overtime in 2006 was in 
sectors where the cyclical response of employment is relatively high (e.g. construction, trade, 
                                                 
10 DG ECFIN (2009) "Economic crisis in Europe: Causes, consequences and responses", Chapter 2, "Impact on 
labour market and employment". European Economy, No 7. 
11 During the current recession the average hours worked fell in Italy and Germany more than during past recent 
recessions. The opposite is observed for France. DG ECFIN (2009), "Labour Market and Wage Developments in 
2008", European Economy, No 8.  
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transports and business services). Thus, had the distribution of overtime remained unchanged 
during recent periods, this would imply  an adjustment more at the extensive than that at the 
intensive margin in these sectors, which may explain the increase in the average hours 
worked.12  
 
A closer look at the correlation between output growth and changes in unemployment reveals 
a stronger link during the latest recession than during the recessions of the early 1980s, which 
is suggestive of a more flexible labour market nowadays, although it could also be driven by 
the sheer size of the contraction in GDP. For the period 1980q1-1983q4, the correlation 
equals to -0.25.  It increased to -0.43 during the period 1990q3-1993q4. During the 2001 
"near" recession, the correlation fell to about the same level as in the early 1980s and picked 
up again to -0.64 during the period 2006q2-2009q2; this increase in correlation is mainly due 
to the inclusion of the current recession quarters (i.e. 2008q2-2009q2). If these quarters are 
excluded, the correlation (over the period 2006q2-2008q2) falls to -0.2. Over the period 
2008q2-2009q2 the correlation coefficient is -0.6. 13 
  
One important element to consider when assessing the employment response to the cycle on 
the basis of its correlation with GDP growth is the stability over time of this correlation. To 
assess this stability, the correlation coefficient between GDP growth and unemployment 
changes has been computed for each period of 5 years starting from the beginning of the 
sample (so the first correlation coefficient is 1980q1-1985q1). Graph 10 displays the mean 
and median of the distribution of the 5 years moving correlation between employment and 
GDP growth by country and the mean GDP growth.14 Clearly the correlation is not constant 
over time as the link between GDP and unemployment is weaker during expansions than 
during contractions. A simple correlation is only informative about the potential link and not 
about the causality. Thus, we turn to a multivariate framework.  
 
Graph 10 - Correlation coefficient between unemployment changes and gdp growth 
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12  Dares, 2008; Premiére Syntèhses Informations Évaluation du volume d'heures supplémentaires rémunérées 
des salaries des secteurs concurrentiels en 2006). Moreover, the July 2008 reform giving to companies the 
possibility to negotiate the amount of overtime might have stimulated also stronger adjustment in the hours 
worked through bilateral negotiation. More details about recent reform of the working time organisation can be 
found in the Country fiche of France of the report "Labour Market and wage developments in 2008".  
13 The correlation is for a sample of countries for which data are available in each period. 
14 The mean is therefore a mean group estimator of the rolling correlation coefficient. 
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Over short-time, a change in output is accompanied by a less than proportional change in 
unemployment because firms may prefer to keep workers rather than lay-off them when 
output falls. Thus, the average productivity of labour rises with employment and output, and 
falls when they decline. In order to identify the effective impact of growth on unemployment 
over the cycle, the standard practice is to estimate the Okuns' law, which relates changes in 
unemployment to output growth. 15 The evidence in Knotek (2007), suggests that the Okun 
relationship varies over time and that a dynamic specification in first difference perform better 
than a specification in terms of deviation from potential output and trend unemployment.  
 
To get hindsight on the extent of labour hoarding, the change in unemployment observed 
during the recession quarters is compared with the change implied by the historical relations 
between output growth and unemployment changes.  
 
A dynamic version of the Okun's law is estimated for each country over the period 1985q1-
2007q4. In addition to the usual contemporaneous GDP growth, three lags of GDP growth 
and two lags of changes in unemployment are included in the regression to capture the 
delayed response of unemployment to economic developments and the persistency of changes 
in unemployment. For each country, an out-of sample forecast of unemployment has been 
generated from this estimate based on the pattern of observed GDP growth. The actual values 
of the change in unemployment are then compared with those generated by the out-of-sample 
forecast. Graph 11 on the left side reports for the period 2008H1-2009H2 the gap between the 
actual employment growth and the employment growth that one would have expected based 
on the historical relationship between employment and GDP growth. A positive value implies 
an under-adjustment of employment to the current fall in output growth - i.e. that the actual 
employment growth was above the value one would have expected from the observed fall in 
GDP growth.  
 
At the onset of the crisis, in Ireland and Spain employment growth was much lower than 
expected given the size of decline of output. In contrast, labour shedding in Latvia and 
Estonia appears more consistent with their sizeable output loss until the end of 2008, but 
became higher than one would have foreseen in the first half of 2009. Only Germany, 
Finland, Lithuania, and Slovakia had in the first half of 2009 a growth of employment higher 
that expected on the basis of the fall in output growth. Graph 11 on the right side does the 
same analysis for the change in the unemployment rate. The rise in unemployment rate is 
below what predicted by an Okun's type relationship in Finland, Austria, the Netherlands and 
Germany.16  
                                                 
15 In his original work (1962), Okun estimated two versions of what has since then become the "Okun's law" 
using U.S. quarterly data from 1948q2 to 1960q1. Both are simple relationships between the change in the 
unemployment rate and a measure of economic activity, which is the real output growth in the first version and 
the output gap in the second version.  
16 The gap between actual and predicted unemployment is significantly different from zero for Austria and 
Germany in 2008q2; for Slovakia in 2008q3; for Belgium, Germany, Finland, the Netherlands, Portugal, 
Slovenia in 2008q4; for Germany, Finland and Netherlands in 2009q1; for Belgium, Germany, Finland, and the 
Netherlands in 2009q2. In all other cases the gap is not significantly different zero, implying that the change in 
unemployment is consistent with the change in output according to an Okun's type relation estimated over the 
period 1980-2007. 
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Graph 11 – Under-prediction and over prediction of Okun's relationships 
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Source: Authors' calculations. Each bar represents the gap between the actual employment growth (unemployment change) and the 
employment growth (unemployment change) expected from a country specific relationship linking employment growth (unemployment 
change) to GDP growth; this relationship has been estimated on quarterly data over the period 1995q1-2007q4; the specification used 
includes the current GDP growth and 3 of its lags and two lags of employment growth (unemployment change). The gaps for the first 
semester of 2008 and 2009 and for the second semester of 2008 are average of the corresponding quarters of semester. 
 
To sum up, the labour market response to the global slowdown has been quite heterogeneous 
across countries. This is partly due to the need for reallocating resources away from specific 
industries characterised by low productivity growth and/or overcapacity. In addition, the use 
of flexible working time arrangements (bilaterally agreed or government sponsored) to avoid 
wasteful labour shedding and preserve firm-specific human capital has varied across 
countries, which explains some of the differences in the labour market responses. 
 
A temporary reduction of the hours worked could be an effective tool to stabilise employment 
only if it is not accompanied by a full compensation of hourly wages that keeps the monthly 
labour income unchanged. Thus, reduced hours should come alongside wage or labour costs 
cuts, the main difference being that the latter are attained through schemes that subsidise 
wages of workers accepting to work fewer hours, while wage cuts are reached usually with 
the mutual consent of the parties (e.g. recession sabbatical). The latter are more efficient as 
they involve bilateral negotiations and their usage should go down as the recovery steps in.  
 
In many European countries, government sponsored schemes are available to employers to 
supplement wages of workers working at reduced hours. The Cassa Integrazione Guadagni in 
Italy, the Chômage technique in France, or the Kurzarbeitergeld in Germany, to mention a 
few. In Italy, the number of hours of wage supplementation (CIG) was around 20 per 
thousands of hours worked between January 2002 and July 2008. It rapidly picked up in 
November of 2008 to reach in April 2009 the highest ever ratio since 2000 (110 per thousands 
of hours worked in industry). In the 2009q2 about 10% of full-time equivalents workers were 
on wage supplementation schemes. Similarly, in Germany the use of short-time employment 
picked-up swiftly, reaching in March 2009 the highest level since the 1992-1993 recessions. 
In France, the proportion of workers in chômage partiel increased from 0.1% in 2008q1 to 
0.7% in 2009q1, but remained below the 1995-2005 average of about 2% (Calavrezo et al., 
2009). Short-time schemes may be an effective instrument to contain wasteful labour 
shedding vis-à-vis a temporary demand shocks in the short-term. This is less obvious if the 
recovery takes more time to materialise and/or companies face the need to restructure. In this 
situation adjustments in the workforce are required which could be hampered if schemes 
"freeze" employment patterns in the affected sectors and companies; there can be a trade-off 
between unemployment today and more redundancies at later stage.  
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To address this, stricter conditionalities to access government support are imposed on firms, 
but it is too early to say if in some countries the increase in the short-time workers for 
economic reasons would anticipate an increase in unemployment when the schemes expire. 
Yet, a concern remains that the limited adjustment observed so far in some countries would 
imply less hiring during the recovery. The risk of jobless or job-low growth is potentially 
high. 
6. Potential risks to the labour market outlook 
The severity of the recession raises concerns about the labour market adjustment and its 
persistency. Job losses may translate in longer spells of unemployment, which will lead to a 
deterioration of skills, contribute to the persistency of unemployment (hysteresis) and increase 
the likelihood of a falling labour supply, ultimately translating in higher natural rate of 
unemployment. This section discusses the potential risks to the labour market outlook. It 
reviews the explanations given for a delayed labour market recovery and looks at the risks of 
jobless growth in Europe. The matching of vacant posts with unemployed and the risk that 
high unemployment translates in high equilibrium unemployment (hysteresis) is discussed 
subsequently. The final section examines the impact of the recession on wages and labour 
costs.  
6.1 The risks of jobless recovery  
At the early stages of a recovery, when they have limited information about their demand, 
firms adjust productivity more than employment, which implies that employment responds 
with a time lag to changes in output. When these lags are substantial, until a sustained and 
consolidated economic growth takes old, job creation remains insufficient to bring 
unemployment down for a prolonged period of time after the upturn, and the recovery turns 
out to be jobless.17 Economists have given a number of explanations for the jobless recoveries 
 
• Employment lags the pickup in the economic growth due to labour hoarding during  
recession. As output falls firms do not fire their workers but hold on them for a time 
even if they are not fully utilised. Thus, when GDP increases, new workers are not 
hired until the existing ones are fully employed. Given the depth of the present 
recession and the massive recourse to short-time employment, this effect could be 
significant. 
 
• Macroeconomic uncertainty can be considered as a stand-alone reason for low 
employment growth at the early stages of economic recovery. As the signals of the 
recovery consolidate, labour demand increases follow the initial increase in 
productivity and profits. Yet, heightened uncertainty may lead firms to postpone 
hiring, thus delaying the time at which employment starts growing again (Bloom, 
2008 and Bloom et al, 2009). 
 
• Another view contends that a reduction in the utilisation of labour occurs during the 
period required to move workers out of restructuring sectors into new occupations. 
The extent of this adjustment and its distribution between different adjustment margins 
(i.e. hours worked against employment) depends on how deep the slump is and the 
                                                 
17 In the US, during the recovery from the 2001 recession, employment grew more slowly than could have been 
explained by sluggish output growth alone. The gains in employment during the recovery were less than what 
observed for the average cycle and made the recovery jobless. Despite the employment growth of the second half 
of 2003, it was only in January 2004 that employment increased above the level recorded at the trough of the 
cycle. The total numbers of hours worked also resumed very slowly compared to previous recoveries.  
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existence of over-manning before the recession. Thus, a long boom followed by a 
shallow recession will be associated with an adjustment mainly at the intensive margin 
(hours worked) while a persistent and deep decline will bring about an adjustment at 
the extensive margin (job destruction). Assuming that jobs are permanently destroyed 
in some sectors, the aggregate employment growth depends on new positions being 
opened in different industries (the sectoral-shift hypothesis), in particular in expanding 
industries, something very unlikely to happen either without a substantial real wages 
cut and/or when there is high uncertainty about the depth and duration of the slump18. 
Among displaced workers, especially in labour intensive sectors, those who have to 
find jobs in sectors different from the ones where they have acquired their skills 
experience longer spells of unemployment than workers who can search for jobs in the 
same sector. Displaced workers are not necessarily suitable to fill new jobs and exert 
little pressure on wages. As a consequence, both the duration of unemployment and 
the NAIRU increase. According to this interpretation, unemployment is expected to 
start decreasing and employment increasing only when the recovery is set on a steady 
path.19 
 
• A fourth view holds that "just-in-time" employment practices allow firms to wait 
before opening new vacancies and hiring full-time workers until the signs of a robust 
recovery materialise in strong demand for their goods and services (Aaronson et al. 
(2004), Schreft and Singh (2003)).  
 
• According to a fifth explanation, a weak labour market may prevail after periods of 
long expansion during which firms delay internal restructuring until the recession 
arrives; high aggregate job destruction would occur as many firms go through a period 
of internal re-organisation (Koenders and Jorgenson, 2005).  
 
• Finally, the intensity of the recession influences the degree of deterioration in 
unemployment during the recovery. Deep recessions are followed by relatively bigger 
declines in unemployment and vice versa (Knotek and Therry, 2009). 
 
A further consideration concerning the current recession relates to the presence of an impaired 
financial sector.  The empirical evidence on international banking crises shows that output 
losses that follow financial crises are highly persistent (Cerra and Saxena, 2008 and IMF, 
2009) and accompanied by a persistent increase in unemployment (Knotek and Terry, 2009)20 
owing to: output losses; the disruption of the credit flows, which creates difficulty in funding 
operating expenses; hiring freezes and delay in the sectoral reallocation (Bloom, 2007). In 
addition, since the self-employed are more likely to be liquidity constrained, the financial 
crisis might reduce access to bank credit for potential new self-employed workers, which may 
                                                 
18 The evidence on the structural shift hypothesis is mixed. See DG ECFIN, "Labour market and wage 
developments in 2004, with special focus on the risk of jobless growth", European Commission - European 
Economy- Special report, No.3/2005. For the US Valletta and Cleary (2008) find as of 2008q3 a low degree of 
sectoral reallocation relative to past economic downturns. 
19 In addition, the employment losses would be only temporary if part of the increase in productivity growth is 
permanent and not simply transitory. In reality, one should distinguish the effects on employment of increases in 
trend productivity due to the introduction of labour saving innovation and technologies and those made possible 
by the introduction of new products at higher value added (i.e. product innovations). In the case of product 
innovations, the effects on labour demand are direct and positive. In the case of process innovations, they depend 
on productivity increases being transferred in lower producer’s and consumer’s prices, which boost demand for 
goods produced. Of course the process is smoother the more competitive are the product markets (including 
retail trade and distribution).  
20 For a panel of 33 high income countries, Knotek and Terry (2009) show that a banking crisis is accompanied 
over four years by an increase in unemployment of about 2.5  pps., and that a banking crisis combined with a 
recession to an increase in unemployment by 3.5 pps. after 4 years into the recovery. 
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make move from self-employment into unemployment or inactivity more prevalent than 
entries in the labour market. 
 
Implications for the European labour markets  
 
During the current recession, the EU and the euro-area unemployment rate increased in the 
2008q2-2009q2 period by more than 2 pps., while GDP declined by about 5 per cent.  This 
means that each percentage point of decline in GDP has implied an increase in unemployment 
of about ½ percentage point. One issue worth investigating is how this change compares with 
the past experience and to what extent the actual increase in unemployment fully reflects the 
decline in output observed so far. The Okun's relationship can be a useful tool to address these 
issues.21 The following specification of the Okun's Law is estimated with GLS and countries 
specific fixed effects.  
 
du=a+b*dlog(GDP)+c*dlog(GDP(-1))+d*dlog(GDP(-2))+e*dlog(GDP(-3))+f*du(-1)+ g*du(-2)+eit 
 
where b, c, d and e captures the impact of GDP growth at various lags on the change in 
unemployment. In particular, in the case of jobless recoveries, unemployment would respond 
more to past than to current changes in GDP. Graph 12 reports for different periods the 
coefficients of this relationship, based on the assumption that current changes in 
unemployment are affected by current output growth, past output growth (up to three lags) 
and past changes in unemployment (up to two lags). The main results are the following:  
 
• The coefficients of current output growth are higher than the coefficient of past output 
growth, but both are now larger than in the 1980s or the 1990s. 
  
• Over time, the exact quantitative form of this relationship has changed somewhat. The 
effect on unemployment of output growth at various lags follows an inverted U-shape 
pattern. The effect is high in the 1980s, decline in the 1990s and pick up again in the 
2000s, but only for the effect of the contemporaneous and lagged output growth. In the 
1990s, the largest statistically significant impact of output growth is attained after one 
quarter, which is suggestive of jobless growth (e.g. Caballero and Hammour, 1999). 
 
• In addition to the direct effect of GDP growth, the persistency of unemployment 
changes (as captured by the lagged effect) falls. This implies that for a given change in 
output growth, past unemployment changes weight less. 
 
                                                 
21 Because of data availability, this relationship has been estimated on two groups of countries. The first is a  
balanced panel which includes BE, DE, ES, FR, IT, SE and UK, and covers the period 1980q1-2008q1; the 
second group pool all EU Member States but Bulgaria. Output growth has its maximum effect on unemployment 
for the coefficient that is the highest in absolute value. 
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Graph 12 – Okun's coefficients over different periods 
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Source: Authors' calculations. Stripped bars display coefficients non-statistically significant. 
 
Thus, there is a change in the relationship between unemployment and output, which implies 
that the contemporaneous developments have a greater weight in determining the change of 
the unemployment rate in the short-term.22 More generally, as documented for the US, the 
relationship may vary considerably over time. In particular, the contemporaneous estimated 
impact of GDP growth rises in samples that include recessions. This result is confirmed by the 
estimation of an Okun's relationship on a sample including all EU countries. Graph 13 reports 
the Okun's coefficients estimated with the technique of the rolling regressions. With this 
procedure the sample length is fixed in each estimation round while the beginning and ending 
dates are increased by one quarter at the time.  
 
In practice, we have fixed a window of 10 years starting from 1981q1-1991q1 and made as 
many regressions are needed to recover the entire period; thus the final sample is 1999q3-
2009q2. The moving sample obviously incorporates different numbers of recessionary 
periods; the shadow bars represent the number of recessions on the total number of 
observations within each sample. By looking at the change in the estimates over time, one can 
infer how the relationship has changed over time and over the business cycle.  
 
Graph 13 suggests that there is an increasing effect on unemployment of GDP growth (at 
various lags) in the recent years. However, during the last quarters this effect diminishes 
which could be caused by the use of reduced working time during the crisis. Moreover, the 
effect of the contemporaneous GDP growth prevails on that of its lags and increases during 
recessions. The same rolling estimation on a smaller window of 5 years (i.e. 20 quarters), 
confirm these findings. A possible explanation of this asymmetry might related to recessions 
being an opportunity for firms to adjust the workforce, as for them the value of foregone 
production associated with unemployment is pro-cyclical and, consequently, the incentive to 
shed labour is stronger during recessions (Davis 1987). Worrying for the short-term outlook is 
the fact that in the past the response of changes in unemployment gets smaller as the economy 
recovers – as it is evident from the estimation ending in mid 1990s. This implies that the 
unemployment rate could react only sluggishly to the recovery. The extent to which recent 
labour market reforms have affected the relationship during the recession is unknown. 
 
                                                 
22 These findings differ from what found for the United States, which give more support to the possibility of 
jobless recovery in this country in the more recent period (Knotek 2007).  
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However, the overall dynamic adjustment of unemployment to a shock depends on output 
growth and on the persistency of unemployment. For the recession of the early 1990s and the 
last recession, Graph 14 reports the dynamic response of unemployment to a change in output 
growth of 1 pp.  
 
It is based on the estimate of an Okun's law in levels. Estimating the equation in first 
differences imposes a unit root in the level of unemployment rate, which implies that 
fluctuations in the level unemployment are driven by permanent shocks and there is no short-
term dynamics in the level of unemployment rate. To avoid this strong assumption, we 
estimate the Okun's low in levels and study the dynamics of the level of the unemployment 
rate. One problem with macro panel is that the error term for different observations can be 
correlated. This happens, for example, when shocks to GDP are correlated across countries. In 
this case the estimates of the parameters are biased and inconsistent. Moreover, there can be 
country specific factors that account for cross-countries differences in the unemployment 
rates. Therefore, in modelling the relation between unemployment rate and GDP we assume 
that unobserved factors that influence GDP are of two types: those constant across countries 
and fixed over time and those that are fixed over countries but vary over time. This allows 
identifying the dynamic response of unemployment to a country specific shock to GDP.  
 
It turns out that the response expected for the current recession is for the first year following 
the decline in output growth similar to that estimated for the recession of the early 1990s, but 
less persistent over time. Thus, without further significant improvements in output growth in 
the coming quarters a substantial effect on unemployment may be expected. Yet, the lower 
persistency of unemployment of the more recent period may suggest that a faster adjustment 
as the economy rebounds. This suggests that past labour market reforms have made 
unemployment more responsive to the cycle. During the present recession, this has partly 
been offset by the use of short-time schemes, which could mean that a recovery would lead to 
a somewhat delayed fall in unemployment; yet, over the medium term, the fall in 
unemployment could be stronger than what has been observed in the past. 
Graph 13 - Okun's coefficients and dynamic response of unemployment 
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Source: Authors' calculations. On the horizontal axis, final year of the sample used for the estimates of rolling coefficients are reported. The 
shares (in %) of recessionary quarters of the total quarters in each estimation window are reported on the vertical axis (right-hand side). 
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Graph 14 - Okun's coefficients and dynamic response of unemployment 
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6.2 How a W- or V-shaped recovery influences unemployment and 
participation rates  
The reaction of the labour market during a recession influences also its response during the 
recovery. In addition, the response of the labour market is also influenced by the timing and 
the shape of the recovery. If the initial recovery is tentative and lacks sustainability, 
employers will be reluctant to open new vacancies and hire workers. The shape of the cycle 
depends very much on the types of shock that caused the recession. In particular, recessions 
that take place together with financial crisis, often caused by overoptimistic expectations of 
income growth, are followed by prolonged and uncertain recoveries (IMF, 2009, Knotek, 
2009).  
 
In order to assess the evolution of labour market aggregates in the aftermath of a recession, it 
can be of interest looking at their evolution in the quarters following past recessions. Since 
recessions are not all alike, a distinction is made between W-shaped and V-shaped recoveries. 
W-shaped recovery are defined as episodes in which output growth resumes after a sharp 
contraction, but for few quarters only, and falls back into recession before the recovery takes 
hold. During V-shaped recoveries, output growth is steadily positive over the quarters that 
follow the trough. In the sample of EU27 countries it is possible to identify 25 recessions23, 
excluding the current recession, 15 of which are W-shaped (Table 6). Graph 15 reports the 
average evolution of GDP growth, employment, unemployment rate and the labour force for 
the 8 quarters that follow the first quarter after which the average W- or V-shaped recovery 
consolidates – i.e. after the trough of the V-shaped recovery and the second dip of a W-shaped 
recovery. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
23 Recessions are identified as at least two consecutive quarters in which output growth has been negative. Due 
to data limitation, the number of identified recessions underestimates the effective number. Only few countries 
have long time series for quarterly data starting from 1980q1.  
 38
Table 6 - Recessions followed by W- and V-shaped recoveries 
Country W-shaped recoveries V-shaped  recoveries
Austria 01q2-01q3
80q2-80q4
92q4-93q1
80q2-80q4
91q2-91q3
02q4-03q2
97q3-97q4
01q4-02q1
Estonia 98q4-99q2
Spain 92q2-93q1
Finland 90q2-91q4
80q2-80q4
92q2-93q1
82q1-82q4
01q2-01q4
Lithuania 98q4-99q1
Portugal 02q3-02q4
Sweden 90q2-93q1
Slovak 
Republic
99q1-99q4
80q2-81q1
90q3-91q3
Italy 92q3-93q3
United 
Kingdom
Denmark 92q4-93q2
France
Recessions followed by
Belgium 01q3-01q4
Germany 95q4-96q1
 
Source:  Authors' calculations. 
 
When the recovery is on a stable path, output growth follows a pattern which does not differ 
across the two types of recoveries – but of course it takes more time for W-shaped recoveries 
to reach this path. As expected, employment continue to contract more, and more persistently, 
during W-shaped recoveries. In the V-shaped case, employment returns to the level that 
prevailed before the recession after about 2 years from the upswing, while it remains steadily 
below this level during W-shaped recoveries. The unemployment rate behaves consistently 
with the evolution of employment in both types of recessions. Unemployment rates keep 
growing during the first year after both W-shape and V-shaped recoveries. Yet, 
unemployment continues to rise for a further two quarters in the case of the relatively more 
solid and fast V-shaped recovery. This finding suggests that during a solid recovery the 
perception of finding a job improves and more people enter into the labour market. Indeed, 
the fourth panel shows clearly that the labour force rises during V-shaped recoveries while it 
mainly hovers around the level which prevails at the early stage of a W-shaped recovery. W-
shaped recessions are, therefore, characterised by significant discouraged workers effects and 
run a high risk of a shrinking labour supply. 
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Graph 15 – GDP, unemployment and employment in the quarters following W- and V- shaped recessions 
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Source: Authors' calculations. Change compared to the end of the recession. 
 
6.3 Matching process and sectoral reallocation: the risk of hysteresis 
Structural imbalances should be dealt with substantial mobility of workers across different 
industries. In the current situation, the main sectors with structural imbalances are 
construction and finance. As housing subside to a level consistent with the replacement of the 
old housing stock and the growth in the population (i.e. the housing boom comes to an end), 
employment in construction and related financial services needs to come down (Phelps, 
2008). A decline in the price-rental ratio triggers an additional decline in the demand for 
labour which could intensify the initial contraction of employment in these sectors. The time 
needed for reallocating workers from these sectors into other sectors may raise the NAIRU. 
 
Graph 16 displays a measure of the sectoral reallocation for selected countries, the so called 
Lillien index. 24 For the largest euro area countries, this measure suggests only an occasional 
and mild sectoral reallocation during slowdowns/recessions, which contrasts with the more 
regular pattern observed in the US.  In Italy and France, the dispersion of employment growth 
across sectors increases sharply during the recession of the early 1990s. During the shallow 
recession of 2003, it increased in Italy as employment growth in manufacturing sector turned 
out negative while employment expanded strongly in services. The index of sectoral 
reallocation capture the intense period of restructuring that followed the German 
reunification. Finally, in 2008 and 2009, the degree of sectoral reallocation increased in all 
countries but Italy. Other countries (not shown for brevity) where the degree of sectoral 
                                                 
24 The index of reallocation is calculated as in Lilien (1982) as the weighted standard deviation of cross-sectoral 
employment growth rates using an industry breakdown in 6 Industries.  
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reallocation rises substantially include the Czech Republic, Denmark, Ireland, Lithuania, 
Netherlands, Slovenia, and Slovakia. 
 
Of course, the dispersion can increase as a result of shifts caused by normal business cycles 
(i.e. aggregate demand shocks) having differentiated impact across sectors. This implies that 
the positive correlation between the dispersion and the unemployment rate would be 
determined by aggregate demand shock rather than by structural change. Indirect evidence of 
the effect of the sectoral reallocation on the structural unemployment rate can be gained by 
comparing the result of a regression of respectively the unemployment rate and the NAIRU 
on the measure of sectoral reallocation (Lillien index). In the first case, an increase by 1 pp. in 
the dispersion of employment growth across sectors is accompanied by an increase in the 
unemployment rate of 0.6 pp. The same regression, with the NAIRU as a measure of the 
natural rate of unemployment gives a response of 0.1 pp. The estimate is done on an 
unbalanced panel of 19 EU countries with data starting from 1981. The specification includes 
the NAIRU and a measure of dispersion (both contemporaneous and lagged). Fixed effects 
and country specific time trends are included to control for factors not captured by the 
reallocation index and that may affect the unemployment rate or the NAIRU. The following 
equations are estimated with fixed effects and country specific trends with feasible GLS; 
variances are robust to cross equation and contemporaneous correlation and heteroschedastic 
error disturbances in each cross section: 
 
ititit disuu )30.0()05.0( 60.0)1(80.0 +−=
 
 
ititit disnairunairu )005.0()02.0( 11.0)1(92.0 +−=
 
where dis is the measure of dispersion; standard error in parentheses; cross-sections 
observations included: 21. Total pooled observations: 328.  
 
It is worth noticing that the impact of the dispersion on unemployment is higher but less 
persistent than the impact on the NAIRU. This suggests that part of the increase in 
unemployment reflects an heterogeneous response across sectors to a aggregate demand 
shocks. However, the slightly higher high persistency of the NAIRU implies that a pure 
sectoral reallocation shock may imply a persistently high structural unemployment rate. Thus, 
looking ahead, the structural unemployment rate may increase in those countries where 
structural reallocation was already occurring in 2008 and 2009. 
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Graph 16 – Lillien index of sectoral reallocation 
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Source: Authors' calculations.. The Lillien index is the standard deviation of the growth rate of employment across 7 industries for the 
average quarter of each year. The standard deviation is weighted with the share of employment in each industry. Grey bars represent 
recessions. 
 
One problem with the measure of sectoral reallocation is that the employment dispersion may 
he Beveridge curve provides a way to distinguish sectoral shifts from cyclical developments. 
raph 17 shows the Beveridge curve for the euro area measured at quarterly frequencies over 
reflect both reallocation shocks and differences in industries' cyclical sensitivity and growth 
trends. In this case, it is difficult to distinguish true reallocations from differences across 
industries in the cyclical response of employment to aggregate fluctuations (Abraham and 
Katz, 1986). During a deep recession, the degree of sectoral reallocation can be very high. At 
the same time, the distribution of skills in the labour force is fixed in the very short run. As a 
result, the mismatch worsens significantly and the effectiveness of the matching process 
deteriorates.  
 
T
It depicts the relationship between job vacancies and unemployment rates. Over the cycle this 
relationship exhibits negative co-movement, with high vacancies and low unemployment 
when the economy is growing and vice versa when it is contracting. This leads to shifts along 
the curve. Shifts in the curve - i.e. positive co-movements between vacancies and 
unemployment - reflect changes in the effectiveness of the matching process, possibly related 
to skill mismatches or sectoral imbalances. Thus, shift leftward are suggestive of an 
improvement in the matching process.  
 
G
the period 1995q1-2009q2. A graphical inspection of data reveals two shifts of the curve 
leftward from the curve of the late 1990s. The first one coincides with the dot-com bubble of 
the late 90s; the second can be identified after the 2001 downturn. Both shifts are likely to 
have been caused by reforms that have made the functioning of the labour market more 
efficient. The improvements have been significant: unemployment rates are about 2-3  pps. 
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lower for a given level of vacancies than in the mid 1990s. These results are consistent with 
analysis carried out by the OECD which suggests that actual unemployment now has a 
smaller impact on structural unemployment than in the mid 1990s. (25) 
 
The behaviour of the data in the latest six quarters up to 2009q2, which include the current 
recession, should be interpreted with caution given the small number of observations 
available. However, so far, it seems that we are observing changes along the curve rather than 
changes of the curve. Yet, it cannot be excluded that protracted sectoral shifts26 may render 
the skills of some workers – particularly those formerly employed in industries with non-
transferable skills – obsolete leading to skill mismatches. When job destruction is high and 
unemployment remains high, due to the process of sectoral reallocation described above, the 
human capital of the labour force deteriorates, which reinforces the skills' mismatch. An 
ensuing deterioration of the matching process would lead to shift rightward of the curve and 
to the risk of unemployment hysteresis. In the current environment, policies aimed at keeping 
people in employment and support the labour market attachment may have contributed to 
avoid wasteful labour shedding and a deterioration of skills.  
 
Graph 17 - The Beveridge curve for the euro-area 
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Source: Survey of Business Statistics. Since data on vacancies are not available on a long time series, the variable from the Employers' 
survey "Factors limiting production: Labour" is used as proxy. The square symbols in black  mark the quarters from 2008q1 to 2009q2. 
 
                                                 
25 OECD (2009).  
26 The sectoral shift hypothesis of unemployment rate suggested by Lilien (1982) can be explained by different 
factors including labour and capital market imperfections that limit the possibility of moving resources between 
sectors and imperfect matching due to the lack of the skills of displaced workers who have to fill positions in 
new expanding sectors.  
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7. Labour supply: the risk of shrinking workforce 
The massive unemployment inflows, which a recession usually brings about, can be harmful 
for the strength of the following recovery. If the large stock of new unemployed workers is 
not absorbed very quickly when the recovery becomes sustainably anchored, labour supply 
may be negatively affected, which may result in an obstacle to future growth. New 
unemployed workers may become long-term unemployed for many reasons. As a result of a 
recession, unemployed people become less effective in their search for a job, leading to more 
persistent unemployment. This may occur because the recession may influence either the 
efficiency with which information about vacancies is transmitted or the time and effort the 
unemployed devote to the job search. In particular, a prolonged period of weak labour 
demand may reduce the search effort of unemployed as discouragement arises after many not 
successful attempts of finding a job (the so-called "discouraged" worker effect). 
Unconditional and extremely generous unemployment benefits may create a moral hazard 
problem which reinforces the propensity of job-searcher to be  highly selective with regard to 
a job offer and increase their reservation wage, that is the  wage level at which they are 
willing to take up job offers. 
 
At the same time, during recessions households' income can be heavily weakened by the risks 
of unemployment of the bread-winner (typically the man). This creates a negative wealth 
effect that induces other components of the household to put more effort in the job search to 
compensate for the expected loss in household income and smooth consumption. The "added" 
worker effect implies that in periods of high unemployment the labour supply of women 
increases, as the consumption smoothing motive prevails on factors, such as the low 
substitution of leisure time between the husband and the wife (for cultural reasons or lack of 
childcare services), that keeps women out of the labour market. Whether the 'discouraged 
worker' or the 'added worker' effect prevails in the recessions is an empirical question. 
Eichengreen and Hatton (1987) studied unemployment pattern in the US during the Great 
Depression and found that a married woman was more likely to work if her husband was an 
unemployed than if he was employed.   
 
In the current recession, some signals of discouraged worker effects prevailing over added 
worker effects have started to emerge, albeit on a small scale. The increase in unemployment 
so far has been limited by a fall in the labour force for two consecutive quarters (-0.3% in the 
fourth quarter of 2008 and -0.5% in the first quarter of 2009).  
 
While these findings could raise some concerns about the effects of the crisis on total labour 
supply, it must be kept in mind that reforms in many countries have strengthened the labour 
market attachment of most vulnerable groups. As a consequence, big reduction in the overall 
activity rate should not occur, implying that job losses are likely to be largely reflected in a 
higher unemployment rate. In addition, there is evidence that governments are not repeating 
the mistakes of past recessions in which early retirement schemes were introduced to reduce 
unemployment by shrinking the size of the labour supply.27  
8. Wage developments 
A slack labour market is generally accompanied by reduced wage pressures. In the face of 
prolonged period of weak demand, firms start to reduce their workforce. The resulting 
increase in the jobless rate, if not accompanied by a shrinking labour supply, will put 
                                                 
27 See "The EU's response to support the real economy during the economic crisis", European Economy, 
Occasional Paper No. 51, 2009. 
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downward pressure on wages, especially where increase in unemployment is sizeable. Even 
so, unit labour costs may increase as firms hoard labour during the recession (i.e. the 
productivity growth declines) while wages are slow to react as they are not continuously 
negotiated. New negotiated wages incorporate the effects of the common aggregate demand 
shock as expired contracts are renegotiated. At this juncture, the capacity of wages to reflect 
changes in demand at the local and sectoral level will probably influence the shape of the 
recovery, in particular in countries where competitiveness is a constraint for economic 
growth. Public wages can play an important role in signalling appropriate wage developments 
for the private sector.  
 
Graph 18 shows the growth of the nominal unit labour costs and of its components, 
compensation per employees and changes in labour productivity. Even though the 
compensation per employee slowed down since the end of 2008, the growth in the nominal 
unit labour costs rose as labour productivity was negatively affected by the labour hoarding. 
Graph 19 shows the growth of compensation per employee and of the negotiated wages for 
the euro area. After having achieved a growth rate of 3.5% in 2008q3, the compensation per 
employee slowed down considerably in the first half of 2009. Even so, nominal unit labour 
costs rose significantly to some 5.8%, a rate never seen since more than a decade, as labour 
productivity was negatively affected by labour hoarding.  
 
As suggested by Graph 19, the decline in compensation per employee has been almost 
entirely led by the fall in the variable component, which over-shooted to compensate for the 
relative invariance of negotiated wages. In fact, negotiated wages responded with a lag of one 
quarter, and only by the end of the year, as the weaknesses in the labour market started to 
become evident, the gap between the two wages started to close.  Looking forward, the 
growth in unit labour costs in the EU and the Euro area is projected to be negative in 2009 and 
consistent with price stability in 2010.  
 
 
Graph 18 – Nominal unit labour costs  
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Graph 19 - Negotiated wages and Compensation per employee 
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Source: Authors' calculations. 
 
The relatively fast response of compensation per employee in the euro area during the current 
crisis is confirmed by an econometric exercise investigating how the compensation per 
employee and the negotiated wages fluctuate in response to an unexpected shock to GDP 
growth. The analysis is developed in a VAR framework, which allows taking into account the 
interdependencies between the variables (growth in compensation per employee, in negotiated 
wages and of GDP). We identify the response of wages assuming a contemporaneous causal 
structure, which implies that unexpected shock to GDP growth in one quarter influences only 
the variable component of compensation in the same quarter, while the negotiated wages 
changes only in the following quarters. Graph 21 gives, respectively, the response of 
compensation per employee and negotiated wages to an unexpected shock to GDP growth.  
 
An unexpected positive shock to GDP growth triggers an adjustment mechanism where the 
variable component of wages adjusts in the same quarter, while negotiated wages respond 
with a lag of one quarter. The growth of compensation per employee rises by 0.1 pp. in the 
case of an unexpected increase in GDP growth by one standard deviation.  The maximum 
effect is achieved after 2 quarters and dies out by the end of the year. After 4 quarters labour 
costs increase by about 0.4 pp. Conversely, the second graph shows that negotiated wages 
reacts with a lag of almost 4 quarters but its effect is not statistically significant. These 
findings are based on the period 1996q1-2009q4. Yet if 2008 and 2009 are excluded from the 
sample, it turns out that nominal wages do not change in response to unexpected GDP shock, 
which is consistent with the presence of nominal wage rigidities in the euro-area. Thus, 
although there has been a response of wages during the current crisis, this has been 
particularly exceptional if judged with the metric of the past historical experience. 
 
Looking forward, the growth in the unit labour costs is expected to be more moderate as new 
negotiated wages start to incorporate the effect of the recession and productivity growth 
recovers as labour hoarding falls. Indeed, the decline in compensation per employee has been 
almost entirely led by the fall in the wage drift. As the economy recovers, it will be important 
that relative wages adjust to respond to productivity differentials and demand patterns at the 
local level. This is of particular importance for those Member States that need to improve 
their competitive position. Given the considerable downward wage rigidity recorded in the 
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past crises, reforms of the wage bargaining system in this respect will be essential in a number 
of cases. 
 
Graph 20 - Response of compensation per employee and negotiated wages to a shock to GDP growth in 
the Euro area 
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Source: Authors' calculations. Identification based on Cholesky decomposition with the order GDP growth, compensation per employee 
growth and negotiated wages growth; dotted line: one sd innovations ± 2se. 
 
Graph 21 - Response of compensation per employee and negotiated wages to a shock hitting one of the two 
variables, assuming that negotiated wages respond to shock to GDP growth with a lag of one quarter 
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Source: Authors' calculations. Identification based on Cholesky decomposition with the order GDP growth, compensation per employee 
growth and negotiated wages growth; dotted line: one sd innovations ± 2se. 
9. Conclusions 
The global downturn has strongly affected the EU labour markets. Yet the increase in 
unemployment has been slow to materialise. The situation differs considerably across 
Member States, both in terms of labour market institutions and constraints on account of the 
fiscal situation and external competitiveness. 
 
The effects on unemployment persistency and human capital can be important, especially 
where the adjustment requires a sectoral reallocation away from traditional declining sectors. 
Restructuring will be necessary in some cases and an increase in unemployment unavoidable. 
There might be a trade-off between less unemployment today and more redundancies at later 
stage, particularly if, as seen in past recessions, the recovery is uncertain and slow to 
materialise. To avoid negative effects on the quality of the labour input and of output 
potential, it is imperative to minimise the deterioration of skills.  
 
At this juncture, the major risks concern the possibility that unemployed people become 
disenfranchised from the labour market and, thus, that high unemployment does not curb the 
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growth of real wages (i.e. becomes structural unemployment). Apart from being a constraint 
to the recovery in the short term, a decline in the labour supply may heavily affect the 
potential output. However, reforms in many countries have strengthened the labour market 
attachment of most vulnerable groups and a large reduction in the overall activity rate is less 
likely now than in the past. In addition, stricter eligibility conditions, uncertain labour market 
prospects for the main earner and considerable wealth losses created by the burst of various 
bubbles lead to negative wealth effects that induce other members of the household to put 
more effort into finding a job to compensate for the expected loss in household income and to 
smooth consumption. This ‘added’ worker effect means that, in periods of high 
unemployment, the labour supply of non-working spouses increases, as the consumption 
smoothing motive prevails over other factors, such as the low substitution of leisure time 
between husband and wife (for cultural reasons or lack of childcare services), that keeps 
women out of the labour market. There is evidence of added worker effects for the Great 
Depression (Eichengreen and Hatton 1987).  
 
There are extensions to this analysis, which, we believe, of further interest. First, we provided 
evidence of heterogeneous impact of the crisis on different socioeconomic groups and 
countries. Further work should attempt to quantify in a multivariate framework the 
determinants of this differentiated performance. In doing so, one could take into account the 
role played by initial institutional and macroeconomic conditions, in particular as far as the 
configuration of labour market institutions and various imbalances prevailing before the crisis 
are concerned, and of workers' socio-demographic characteristics. Second, further work 
should try to identify the role played by crisis-related measures in the stabilisation of 
employment and unemployment. Third, further exploration of inflows and outflows rates 
would provide some insight on how labour market institutions have influenced the job 
creation and job destruction process during the crisis compared to the normal times. By 
identifying policies that are more needed for specific purposes (i.e. to enhance job finding or 
reduce job destruction), this analysis would help to devise a framework for the appropriate 
policy response to cyclical fluctuations.  
. 
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